2 research outputs found

    Lifeguard: Local Health Awareness for More Accurate Failure Detection

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    SWIM is a peer-to-peer group membership protocol with attractive scaling and robustness properties. However, slow message processing can cause SWIM to mark healthy members as failed (so called false positive failure detection), despite inclusion of a mechanism to avoid this. We identify the properties of SWIM that lead to the problem, and propose Lifeguard, a set of extensions to SWIM which consider that the local failure detector module may be at fault, via the concept of local health. We evaluate this approach in a precisely controlled environment and validate it in a real-world scenario, showing that it drastically reduces the rate of false positives. The false positive rate and detection time for true failures can be reduced simultaneously, compared to the baseline levels of SWIM

    Retaining Sandbox Containment Despite Bugs in Privileged Memory-Safe Code

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    Flaws in the standard libraries of secure sandboxes represent a major security threat to billions of devices worldwide. The standard libraries are hard to secure because they frequently need to perform low-level operations that are forbidden in untrusted application code. Existing designs have a single, large trusted computing base that contains security checks at the boundaries between trusted and untrusted code. Unfortunately, flaws in the standard library often allow an attacker to escape the security protections of the sandbox. In this work, we construct a Python-based sandbox that has a small, security-isolated kernel. Using a mechanism called a security layer, we migrate privileged functionality into memory-safe code on top of the sandbox kernel while retaining isolation. For example, significant portions of module import, file I/O, serialization, and network communication routines can be provided in security layers. By moving these routines out of the kernel, we prevent attackers from leveraging bugs in these routines to evade sandbox containment. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by studying past bugs in Java’s standard libraries and show that most of these bugs would likely be contained in our sandbox
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